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Abstract
We study a risk sensitive control version of the lifetime ruin probability problem. We
consider a sequence of investments problems in Black-Scholes market that includes a risky
asset and a riskless asset. We present a differential game that governs the limit behavior.
We solve it explicitly and use it in order to find an asymptotically optimal policy.
Keywords: Probability of lifetime ruin, optimal investment, risk sensitive control, large
deviations, differential games.
1 Introduction
The problem of how an individual should invest her wealth in a risky financial market in order
to minimize the probability of outliving her wealth, also known as the probability of lifetime
ruin was extensively analyzed, see e.g. [20], [27], [5], [4], [6], [7], [26], and [8]. These works
fall naturally within the area of optimally controlling wealth to reach a goal. Research on this
topic goes back to the seminal work of [13] and continued with the work of [22], [21], [25], [19],
[18], [9], [10], and [11].
In the standard Black-Scholes market that includes a risky asset and a riskless asset, the
case of interest is when the investor consumes more than the potential profit that follows
by investing the entire wealth in the riskless asset, that is c(x) > rx, in which c(·) is the
consumption function, r is the constant riskless rate, and x is the current wealth. The other
case is trivial, of-course, since by investing the entire wealth in the riskless asset the wealth
cannot decrease and ruin is avoided. In case that c(x) − rx ≈ 0+ then the investor who
wishes to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin should invest almost all of her wealth in the
riskless asset. The probability of ruin would be small, yet positive. With the understanding
that lifetime ruin is a rare and dramatic event and that one should also avoid living close to the
∗web: www-personal.umich.edu/∼ erhan/, email: erhan@umich.edu
†web: https://sites.google.com/site/asafcohentau/, email: asafc@umich.edu
1
ruin level, we study this case, by using a risk sensitive control framework. The risk sensitive
control criteria, penalizes such events heavily, and therefore, provides a natural way to address
these considerations.
We study the risk sensitive control via large deviations techniques. In [23], Pham provides
some applications and methods of large deviations in finance and insurance. Among the
studied models, he considers ruin problems when the initial reserve is large and therefore, the
probability of ruin is small. We, on the other hand, study a lifetime ruin problem, which is
a different problem, and via risk sensitive control with small noise, as described below, which
yields a different analysis.
In order to rigorously treat the mentioned case that c(x)− rx ≈ 0+ we consider a sequence
of models, indexed by n ∈ N, that differ from each other only in the consumption function in
a way that cn(x)− rx = O(1/n), where n is a large parameter. By using an appropriate time
scaling we get a risk sensitive control with small noise as follows: The scaled wealth process
under the consumption function cn satisfies
dW˜ n(t) = b(W˜ n(t),pin(t))dt+
1√
n
σ(W˜ n(t),pin(t))dB(t), t ≥ 0,
W˜ n(0) = x
for some proper b and σ, where pin is the investment policy, and B is a standard Brownian
motion. The goal is to choose pin that minimizes
1
n
lnE
[
e
n
(∫ τna ∧τnd
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤τnd }
)]
,
where τnd is the time of death, τ
n
a is the time of reaching the ruin level a, ρ is a penalty for
lifetime ruin, and l is a nonnegative non-increasing Lipschitz function that penalizes low wealth.
We present a differential game that governs the limiting behavior. We solve it explicitly and
use it in order to find an asymptotically optimal policy.
Risk sensitive control for controlled stochastic differential equations with small noise have
been studied for example in [16], [17], and [14]. For a survey about the topic the reader
is referred to [15]. There are several approaches towards this problem. In [17], Fleming
and Soner used differential equations tools and show that the sequence of the appropriate
prelimit Hamiltonians converges to the Hamiltonian that is associated with the differential
game. Among other requirements, it is assumed that the terminal cost is continuous and
that the terminal time is fixed. In our case, the indicator takes the role of the terminal cost,
which besides of being not continuous, in this case it also depends on the history of the wealth
process. Also, we consider a random terminal time that is independent of the wealth process.
Moreover, partial differential equations techniques does not provide asymptotically optimal
policies, while we do.
In [14], Dupuis and Kushner approached a risk sensitive control problem of minimizing
escape time probabilities by techniques taken from the theory of large deviation. Some of their
requirements are that the drift and the diffusion coefficients, b and σ respectively, are bounded
and the latter is also non-degenerate and does not depend on the control. These requirements
are essential for the proofs. Also, they use a fixed terminal time. In our model, besides that the
terminal time is random, the drift and the diffusion coefficients are assumed to be Lipschitz,
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but only the diffusion coefficient, σ, is assumed to be bounded. We allow σ to be zero and to
depend on the control. In fact, under the asymptotically optimal policy that we suggest the
diffusion coefficient can be degenerate.
Recently, in [1] and [2] the authors considered a queuing network problem under the mod-
erate deviation heavy traffic regime. By using a variant of the proof of Varadhan’s lemma and
some properties of the differential game, an asymptotic optimality in the queueing systems
is shown. In these papers, the controlled stochastic processes are not diffusion, but they are
relatively close in distribution to a controlled diffusion with small noise. Therefore, the anal-
ysis requires some additional tools, and mainly the Skorohod mapping. While the structure
of the queueing network in the prelimit raises some difficulties, the approximated diffusion is
relatively simple and consists of Brownian motion (reflected Brownian motion, in the second
paper) with drift. Although our proof considers some measure change arguments and is in-
spired by the proof of Varadhan’s lemma, in contrast to [1] and [2], we need to work with a
controlled diffusion process.
Regarding the random terminal time, the cost function can be referred as a discounted
version of the risk sensitive cost. The only model from the above that considered a similar
discounted structure is [2]. However, unlike the mentioned paper, we consider a scaled discount
factor. The differential game associated with [2] appears in [3] and like in our case, the optimal
solution of the game is time-homogeneous. Motivated by this property we analyze discounted
risk sensitive control with small noise diffusions further in a future paper.
Let us summarize the contribution of this paper:
• We propose a risk-sensitive cost for a lifetime ruin problem, which can be expressed as a
discounted risk sensitive cost. We present a differential game that governs the limiting
behavior.
• We solve the differential game explicitly, including finding an optimal policy for the
minimizer that leads to an asymptotically optimal policy in the prelimit stochastic model.
• Our assumptions over the diffusion process are weaker than what usually appears in the
literature, and yet we manage to find an asymptotically optimal control.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model, intro-
duce the differential game, and state the main results. In Section 3 we analyze the differen-
tial game, present an Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation, characterize the differential
game’s value function as its unique solution, and we provide an explicit expression for the value
function. Then we present an explicit optimal control for the minimizer, and a simple control
for the maximizer that achieves the value function. In Section 4 we prove the main result by
showing that in the limit the differential game describes the stochastic model.
We close this section by introducing some frequently used notation.
Notation. We denote [0,∞) by R+. For f : [0, t] → R let |f |t := sup0≤s≤t |f(s)|. For any
interval I denote byAC(I) and C(I) the spaces of absolutely continuous functions (resp., contin-
uous functions) mapping I → R. Write AC0(I) and C0(I) for the subsets of the corresponding
function spaces, of functions that start at zero.
3
2 Model and results
2.1 The stochastic model
We consider a sequence of stochastic models, indexed by n ∈ N of an investor who trades
continuously in a Black-Scholes type financial market with no transaction costs. We allow
borrowing and short-selling. The price of the riskless asset follows
dV (t) = rV (t)dt,
where r ≥ 0 is the constant interest rate. The risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dS(t) = S(t) [µdt+ σdB(t)] ,
where µ > r and σ > 0 are constants and (B(t))t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion. For reasons
that will be clear onwards we define a sequence of consumption functions, indexed by n. For
any given n ∈ N we assume that consumption function takes the form: cn(·) = r ·+ 1
n
e(·), for
some function e : [a,∞) → R. We assume that e(·) is a Lipshcitz function and that there is
a positive constant M0 such that e(·) ≤ M0. For every n ∈ N and at any given time t ≥ 0
let κn(t) be the amount of money that is invested in the risky asset. Then the wealth process
satisfies
dW n(t) = (rW n(t)− cn(W n(t)) + (µ− r)κn(t)) dt+ σκn(t)dB(t), t ≥ 0,
W n(0) = x.
Now, by using time scaling and by referring to W˜ n(·) =W n(n·) we get that
dW˜ n(t) =
(
−e(W˜ n(t)) + (µ − r)pin(t)
)
dt+
1√
n
σpin(t)dB(t), t ≥ 0, (2.1)
W˜ n(0) = x,
where pin(·) = nκn(n·). In what follows we will denote by {Ft}0≤t≤2T , the usual augmentation
of the natural filtration generated by the Brownian motion in (2.1). From now onwards, we
refer to pin as the control. We denote byΠ =ΠM1the collection of all progressively measurable
processes (pi(t))t≥0 such that |pi(·)| ≤ M1, which we refer to as admissible policies, where M1
is a positive constant. We take pin ∈ Π. By the assumptions on e(·) and pin it follows that
for every x > 0, the above admits a unique solution. For every n ∈ N, denote by τna the first
time that W˜ n reaches a ∈ (0, x), which we will refer to as the ruin level. The investor would
like to avoid ruin during her lifetime and also to avoid long living close to the ruin level. Also,
let τnd be the investor’s random time of death. Due to the time scaling, we assume that τ
n
d
is exponentially distributed with parameter λn. The goal of the investor is to minimize the
following risk sensitive control cost:
Jn(x,pin) : =
1
n
lnE
[
e
n
(∫ τna ∧τnd
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤τnd }
)]
=
1
n
lnE
[∫ ∞
0
e−λnten
(∫ τna ∧t
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
dt
]
+
1
n
ln(λn),
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where ρ > 0 stands for the punishment cost for ruining and l : [a,∞) → [0, λ) is a non-
increasing function. The function l represents a punishment for the investor when her wealth
is close to the ruin level a. Obviously, we would like to give higher punishment when the
wealth is closer to a. Moreover, since we would like that, given n, the function Jn would be
decreasing with respect to (w.r.t.) the wealth, we require that l(·) < λ. Otherwise, Jn would
be increasing around a. This case represents a situation when the punishment of living close to
the ruin level dominates the punishment from being ruined. Notice also that the last term on
the right-hand side (r.h.s.) of the above goes to zero as n goes to infinity. For this reason we
will ignore it in the analysis in Section 4. We summarize the assumptions mentioned above:
Assumption 2.1 Set the following constants µ > r > 0, σ,M0, a, λ > 0. Also, let e : [a,∞)→
[−∞,M0] be Lipschitz and l : [0,∞)→ [0, λ) be a Lipschitz and non-increasing function.
The assumption is at force throughout the paper.
We study the problem when n→∞. As mentioned in the introduction, both the prelimit
stochastic model and the limit suffer from several complexities in the analysis. First, the
indicator part of the cost function complicates the analysis because it depends on the history
of the process and if we look at it as a terminal cost, then it is not continuous w.r.t. the
terminal wealth. Second, we study a discounted version of the risk sensitive cost. To the best
of our knowledge such formulation studied before only in [2] and also in a queueing system
framework and with a discount that is free of n. Third, the diffusion coefficient is not necessarily
bounded away from zero and it depends on the control. In fact as is shown in Section 2.3, the
asymptotically optimal policy may become zero and therefore, so does the volatility coefficient.
Therefore, the Hamiltonian method of [17, Chapter XI.7], or change of measure method of [14]
do not work here. We find an asymptotically optimal policy for the problem by studying a
differential game. We show that as n → ∞ the optimal risk sensitive cost function converges
to the value of the game, and that an asymptotically optimal policy can be deduced from the
minimizer’s optimal control in the game.
2.2 Differential game setting
In this section, inspired by [17, Chapter XI.7] and [12, Theorem 5.6.7] we describe a differential
game associated with the optimal risk sensitive control problem. We denote by Π = ΠM1 the
set of all Lipschitz functions pi : [a,∞] → [−M1,M1]. Given pi ∈ Π and ψ ∈ AC0[0,∞), the
state process associated with the initial condition x and the data ψ and pi is given by
ϕ˙(t) = −e(ϕ(t)) + (µ − r)pi(ϕ(t)) + σpi(ϕ(t))ψ˙(t), t ≥ 0, (2.2)
ϕ(0) = x.
One can easily verify that the state process is well-defined, see [24, Theorem 19.12]. Note the
analogy between the above and (2.1). The game payoff is
sup
T∈[0,∞)
{∫ T∧τ
0
[−λ+ l(ϕ(t))]dt − I(T ∧ τ, ψ) + ρ1{τ≤T}
}
,
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where τ is the first time that the state process hits the ruin level a and for every t > 0, I(t, ·)
is a function mapping C[0, t] to R+ ∪ {+∞} defined as
I(t, ψ) :=


1
2
∫ t
0
ψ˙2(s)ds if ψ ∈ AC0[0, t],
+∞ otherwise.
The function I is the rate function1 of the Brownian motion ( 1√
n
B(t))t, as n → ∞, see [12,
Theorem 5.2.3]. The “supT∈[0,∞)” is the differential game analogue of the control problem’s
discount factor, λn. The payoff is maximized over ψ and minimized over pi. By the definition
of the function I we may restrict the maximizer only to ψ ∈ AC0[0,∞).
The control pi ∈ Π is taken to be a feedback control and ψ ∈ AC0[0,∞) and T ∈ R+ are
open-loop controls. We call ψ the path part of the control and the T a termination time part
of the control. Given x ∈ [a,∞), pi ∈ Π, ψ ∈ AC0[0,∞), and T ∈ R+, we define the cost until
time T by
C(x, pi, ψ, T ) :=
∫ T∧τ
0
[−λ+ l(ϕ(t)) − 1
2
ψ˙2(t)]dt+ ρ1{τ≤T}. (2.3)
The value of the game is defined by
U(x) := inf
pi∈Π
sup
ψ∈AC0[0,∞),T∈R+
C(x, pi, ψ, T ). (2.4)
In the remark below we show that the maximizer can be restricted to a smaller set of controls
without any loss. This property serves us in the sequel.
Remark 2.1 (1) Since l(·) < λ it follows that for every ψ ∈ AC0[0,∞) and every T ∈ R+ one
has
∫ T∧τ
0 [−λ+ l(ϕ(t))− 12 ψ˙2(t)]dt ≤ 0. Therefore, without any loss for the maximizer she can
be restricted to ψ’s under which τ <∞ and T ∈ {0, τ}.
(2) Notice moreover that the maximizer can also be restricted to ψ’s for which the state process
satisfies ϕ(t) < ϕ(0) =: x for every t > 0 and by (1) above also τ < ∞. Indeed, since the
integrand on the r.h.s. of (2.3) is negative then the only way that U is positive is in case that
τ < ∞. Let ψ = ψpi be such that τ < ∞. Denote by τx the last time before time τ that
ϕ(t) = x. Then,
C(x, pi, ψ, τ) =
∫ τ
0
[−λ+ l(ϕ(t)) − 1
2
ψ˙2(t)]dt+ ρ
<
∫ τ
τx
[−λ+ l(ϕ(t)) − 1
2
ψ˙2(t)]dt+ ρ
=
∫ τ−τx
0
[−λ+ l(ϕx(t))− 1
2
(ψ˙x)
2(t)]dt+ ρ
= C(x, pi, ψx, τ − τx),
1Although we are not using explicitly large deviation arguments in the paper, for intuition reasons we still
choose to define the cost by using the rate function instead of simply using only 1
2
∫ t
0
ψ˙2(s)ds.
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where ψx(·) := ψ(τx+ ·) and ϕx(·) := ϕ(τx+ ·). The last equation follows since τ−τx is the first
time that the state process ϕx hits a. That is, ψx generates a greater payoff for the maximizer
and the associated state process does not cross x upwards. Therefore, for every x ∈ [a, b]
U(x) = max
{
0, inf
pi∈Π
sup
ψ∈Ax,pi
C(x, pi, ψ, τ)
}
, (2.5)
where from now onwards Ax,pi is the restriction to absolutely continuous ψ’s that satisfy the
conditions mentioned in (2) above.
2.3 Main results
We now present the main theorem, which states that the limit of the value functions of the
stochastic model converge to the value function of the game. Moreover, we state an asymptot-
ically optimal policy for the stochastic model.
For every n ∈ N, set the stochastic control pi∗(t) = pi∗,n(t) = pi∗(W˜ n(t)), t ≥ 0, where pi∗
is the function
pi∗(x) =


(µ − r)e(x)
σ2(12 (
µ−r
σ
)2 + λ− l(x)) , a ≤ x < d,
0, d ≤ x,
(2.6)
where
d := b ∧ inf
{
y > a : ρ−
∫ y
a
λ− l(u) + 12(µ−rσ )2
e(u)
du = 0
}
. (2.7)
and 2
b := inf{x ≥ a : e(x) < 0}.
By the definition of b and since e(·) ≤M0 it follows that pi∗ ∈ ΠM1 for some suitable M1.
We will show that the control pi∗ is an optimal control for the minimizer in the differential
game and the value function, U , is given by
U(x) =


ρ−
∫ x
a
λ− l(u) + 12(µ−rσ )2
e(u)
du, a ≤ x < d,
0, d ≤ x.
(2.8)
Since U(x) = 0 for every x ≥ d, the parameter d is referred as the “safe level”. Notice that the
punishment cost ρ affects pi∗ and U through the parameter d, which increases as a function of
ρ. Therefore, if ρ is higher, the safe level is greater. Clearly, it also affects U directly linearly
on [a, d).
The next theorem connects between the game and the stochastic model.
Theorem 2.1 (Main Result) Let Un(·) := infpi∈Π Jn(·,pi). For every x ≥ a one has,
limn→∞ Un(x) = U(x), and moreover, limn→∞ Jn(x,pi∗) = U(x).
The proof is given in Section 4.
2We use the convention that inf ∅ = ∞. Also, hereafter, in case that b = ∞ then by the notation (x, b] and
[x, b] mean (x,∞) and [x,∞) respectively.
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3 Solution and analysis of the game
In this section we provide a solution of the game. We start by some basic properties of the
value function in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we present the HJB equation and a verification
lemma. Then we derive the explicit expressions for U and the optimal control. Finally, in
Section 3.3 we provide a simple control for the maximizer, which assures her the payoff U(x).
3.1 Basic properties
We begin by providing some basic properties that the value function satisfies. These properties
are used in the verification lemma below.
Lemma 3.1 The function U , defined in (2.4), satisfies the following conditions:
i. 0 ≤ U(x) ≤ ρ, x ∈ [a,∞) and U(a) = ρ.
ii. For every x ≥ b one has U(x) = 0
iii. U is non-increasing.
Due to part ii of the previous, in the sequel, we analyze U only on the interval [a, b).
Proof of Lemma 3.1: i. By choosing T = 0, the maximizer can guarantee U ≥ 0. On the
other hand, since l(·) − λ < 0 then clearly U(·) ≤ ρ. By choosing T = 0, one easily gets that
U(a) = ρ.
ii. We show that when x ≥ b, taking pi ≡ 0 we can avoid ruin. Indeed, if pi ≡ 0, then ϕ˙ = −e(ϕ),
ϕ(0) = x ≥ b. In case that x = b then ϕ(·) ≡ b. In case that x > b then since the function e(·)
is Lipschitz we get by Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem that there is a unique ϕ ∈ C1[0,∞) that solves
the ordinary differential equation that is mentioned above. One can easily verify that once ϕ
reaches the level b it remains at this level from this time onwards. Therefore, ϕ ≥ b.
iii. Fix x ∈ (a,∞) and y > x and set ϕ(0) = y. Let τx := inf{t ≥ 0 : ϕ(t) = x}. Using the
dynamic programming principle along with the fact that l(·) < λ, we obtain that
U(y) = inf
pi∈Π
sup
ψ∈Ay,pi,T∈R+
[∫ T∧τx
0
[−λ+ l(ϕ(t)) − 1
2
ψ˙2(t)]dt+ U(x)
]
≤ U(x).
✷
3.2 The HJB equation
In this section we prove that equation (2.8) holds. We start with a verification lemma in
which we provide the HJB (or rather the Isaacs) equation for the problem. Then we present
a solution for this equation. Recall that by Lemma 3.1.ii, U(x) = 0 for x ≥ b. Therefore, we
limit ourselves to the interval [0, b).
Lemma 3.2 (Verification Lemma) Let V : [a, b) → [0, ρ], with V (a) = ρ, be a non-
increasing, continuous function that is differentiable on (a, β), where β := b ∧ inf{x > a :
V (x) = 0}. Assume that the following conditions hold:
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(i) For every x ∈ [a, β) one has
[The HJB equation] inf
p∈R
sup
θ∈R
{
V ′(x)(−e(x) + (µ− r)p+ σpθ)− λ+ l(x)− 1
2
θ2
}
= 0;
(3.1)
(ii) Let P (x) = − µ−r
σ2V ′(x)
. Then for every ψ ∈ AC0 and every x ∈ [a, β), there exists a unique
solution to (2.2) when we replace pi with P .
(iii) Let Θ(p, x) = σpV ′(x). Then for every pi ∈ Π, and a ≤ x < β, there exists a unique
solution to
ϕ˙(t) = −e(ϕ(t)) + (µ− r)pi(ϕ(t)) + σpi(ϕ(t))Θ(pi(ϕ(t)), ϕ(t)), t ∈ [0, τa], (3.2)
ϕ(0) = x
such that
∫ t
0 Θ(pi(ϕ(u)), ϕ(u))du ∈ Ax,pi (see Remark 2.1), where τa := inf{t ≥ 0 : ϕ(t) = a}.
Then U = V on [a, b). Moreover, the function P is an optimal feedback control.
Notice that we defined the HJB equation only on the interval [a, β). This structure follows
since for every x for which U(x) = 0, under optimality of both players, the time part of the
maximizer’s control equals zero and the game is terminated immediately.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: 1. As a first step we will prove that for every x ∈ [a, β) one has
V (x) ≥ U(x). As a result, if β < b then 0 = V (β) ≥ U(β) ≥ 0, where the last inequality
follows by the first assertion of Lemma 3.1. Since V ≥ 0 and U is non-increasing we get that
V ≥ U on [a, b).
Fix x ∈ [a, β). Set the control pi∗ = P . Also, fix a control ψ ∈ Ax,pi∗ and denote by ϕ∗ the
state process associated with pi∗ and ψ. Recall that by the definition of Ax,pi∗, for every t > 0,
one has ϕ∗(t) < ϕ∗(0) = x and that τ∗a < ∞, where τ∗a is the first time that ϕ∗ reaches a.
Recalling moreover that x < β we get that for every t ≥ 0, ϕ∗(t) < β. Since V is differentiable
on [a, β) we can apply the chain rule to V and get
V (ϕ∗(τ∗a ))− V (ϕ∗(0)) =
∫ τ∗a
0
V ′(ϕ∗(t))[−e(ϕ∗(t)) + (µ− r)pi∗(ϕ∗(t)) + σpi∗(ϕ∗(t))ψ˙(t)]dt.
Using again the inequality ϕ∗(t) < β we get by conditions (i) and (ii) that
0 = sup
θ∈R
{
V ′(ϕ∗(t))[−e(ϕ∗(t)) + (µ− r)pi∗(ϕ∗(t)) + σpi∗(ϕ∗(t))θ]− λ+ l(ϕ∗(t))− 1
2
θ2
}
≥ V ′(ϕ∗(t))[−e(ϕ∗(t)) + (µ − r)pi∗(ϕ∗(t)) + σpi∗(ϕ∗(t))ψ˙(t)]− λ+ l(ϕ∗(t))− 1
2
ψ˙2(t).
So we have
V (x) ≥
∫ τ∗a
0
[−λ+ l(ϕ∗(t))− 1
2
ψ˙2(t)]dt+ ρ. (3.3)
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By taking first supψ∈Ax,pi and then infpi∈Π on both sides, we get that
V (x) ≥ inf
pi∈Π
sup
ψ∈Ax,pi
C(x, pi, ψ, τ∗a ).
By the above and recalling that V ≥ 0 we get by (2.5) that V (x) ≥ U(x).
2. By using the assumption that V is non-increasing and that U ≥ 0 it follows that it is
sufficient to prove that V ≤ U on x ∈ [a, β). Fix x ∈ [a, β). For every pi ∈ Π denote
Θ(pi(ϕ∗(t)), ϕ∗(t)) by ψ˙∗(t), where ϕ∗ solves (3.2). By (iii) ϕ∗ reaches a in a finite time, that
is, τa <∞. Using conditions (i) and (ii) we get that
0 = inf
p∈R
{
V ′(ϕ∗(t))[−e(ϕ∗(t)) + (µ− r)p+ σpΘ(p, ϕ∗(t))]− λ+ l(ϕ∗(t))− 1
2
Θ2(p, ϕ∗(t))
}
(3.4)
≤ V ′(ϕ∗(t))[−e(ϕ∗(t)) + (µ− r)pi(ϕ∗(t)) + σpi(ϕ∗(t))ψ˙∗(t)]− λ+ l(ϕ∗(t))− 1
2
(ψ˙∗)2(t).
Recalling that
ϕ˙∗(t) = −e(ϕ∗(t)) + (µ− r)pi(ϕ∗(t)) + σpi(ϕ∗(t))ψ˙∗(t),
we get that
V (x) ≤
∫ τa
0
[−λ+ l(ϕ∗(t))− 1
2
(ψ˙∗)2(t)]dt+ ρ.
By taking supψ∈Ax,pi first and then infpi∈Π on both sides, we get that
V (x) ≤ inf
pi∈Π
sup
ψ∈Ax,pi
C(x, pi, ψ, τ).
By the definition of β and since x < β it follows that V (x) > 0. Therefore,
inf
pi∈Π
sup
ψ∈Ax,pi
C(x, pi, ψ, τ) > 0
and by (2.5) it follows that U(x) = infpi∈Π supψ∈Ax,pi C(x, pi, ψ, τ). Therefore, V (x) ≤ U(x).
Now, the optimality of the feedback control P follows from (3.3). ✷
We now use the verification lemma in order to provide an explicit expression for the value
function U .
Proposition 3.1 Let
V (x) =


ρ−
∫ x
a
λ− l(u) + 12(µ−rσ )2
e(u)
du, a ≤ x < d,
0, d ≤ x,
(3.5)
where d is defined in (2.7). Then V = U , defined in (2.4). Moreover, the control pi∗ given in
(2.6) is optimal.
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Proof: Recall that by the second assertion of Lemma 3.1, for every x ≥ b, U(x) = 0. We
now prove that (3.5) holds for x ∈ [a, b) using Lemma 3.2. Notice that the parameter β that
appears in the verification lemma is actually d for our particular function V . First, it is easy
to check that V satisfies (3.1). Next, since P : [a, d]→ R given by
P (x) = − µ− r
σ2V ′(x)
=
(µ− r)e(x)
σ2(12(
µ−r
σ
)2 + λ− l(x))
is (locally) Lipschitz, requirement ii. of the verification lemma also holds.
Now we will verify the third condition in the verification lemma. Notice, that (3.2) admits
a unique solution on the time interval [0, τa ∧ τd], where τd is the first time that ϕ hits d. The
equation in (3.2) admits a unique solution on [0, τa∧τd] since (a) on this time interval ϕ ∈ [a, d]
and the functions e, pi, and V ′ are bounded on the interval [a, d] and (b) e is Lipschitz, and pi2
and V ′ are locally Lipschitz.
Next, we will show that the above argument can be upgraded to the interval [0, τa]. Observe
that the inequality in (3.4) holds with ψ˙(·) := Θ(pi(ϕ(·)), ϕ(·)) and ϕ(t) replacing ψ˙∗(t) and
ϕ∗(t). Moreover, since V is non-increasing, we get that V ′(ϕ(t)) ≤ 0 and together with (3.4)
in this case, actually V ′(ϕ(t)) < 0 on t ∈ [0, τa ∧ τd]. Hence,
ϕ˙(t) = −e(ϕ(t)) + (µ− r)pi(ϕ(t)) + σpi(ϕ(t))ψ˙(t) ≤ λ− l(ϕ(t)) +
1
2(ψ˙)
2(t)
V ′(ϕ(t))
< 0.
Thus, ϕ does not cross ϕ(0) upwards and therefore, τd =∞, which implies (3.2).
As a final step we will show that ϕ hits a in a finite time as a result of which we will obtain
that we get that ψ ∈ Ax,pi. Assume to the contrary that τa =∞, then by using again (3.4) in
our case, we conclude that for every s > 0 one has
V (ϕ(0)) − V (ϕ(s)) ≤
∫ s
0
[−λ+ l(ϕ(t)) − 1
2
(ψ˙)2(t)]dt.
Since l(·) < λ we get that the r.h.s. of the above goes to −∞ when s→∞, which contradicts
the fact that V is bounded.
The optimality of pi∗ follows by the verification lemma and since U = V .
✷
3.3 Saddle point property
Here, we provide a control (for the maximizer) that is independent of pi and that assures her
the payoff U(x). The simplicity of this control will be crucial in Section 4.1. Set
ψ∗(t) = −µ− r
σ
t, t ≥ 0, (3.6)
and let T ∗ = τ in case x < d and T ∗ = 0 otherwise. Notice that ψ∗ is independent of the
control pi. Moreover, notice that under ψ∗ the state process satisfies ϕ˙ = −e(ϕ) and therefore
ϕ and T ∗ are also independent of the choice of pi.
11
Proposition 3.2 For every x ∈ [a,∞) one has U(x) = inf
pi∈Π
C(x, pi, ψ∗, T ∗). Moreover,
T ∗ ≤ ρ− U(x)
λ− l(a) + 12(µ−rσ )2
. (3.7)
Proof: For x ≥ d one has U(x) = 0 and by definition T ∗ = 0, so that inf
pi
C(x, pi, ψ∗, T ∗) = 0.
Set x < d.
Under ψ∗, the state process is independent of pi. Hence, for every pi ∈ Π
C(x, pi, ψ∗, T ∗) =
∫ T ∗
0
[
−λ+ l(ϕ(t)) − 1
2
(ψ˙∗)2(t)
]
dt+ ρ
= −
∫ x
a
λ− l(u) + 12(µ−rσ )2
e(u)
du+ ρ
= U(x),
where the second equality follows by the change of variables u = ϕ(t), and the last equality
follows by Proposition 3.1. Hence, the first part of the theorem is proved.
Since l is non-increasing we get by (2.5) that
0 < U(x) =
∫ T ∗
0
[
−λ+ l(ϕ(t)) − 1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2]
dt+ ρ
≤
∫ T ∗
0
[
−λ+ l(a)− 1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2]
dt+ ρ
= −T ∗
[
λ− l(a) + 1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2]
+ ρ
and (3.7) follows. ✷
4 Proof of Theorem 2.1
The proof of Theorem 2.1 follows by some measure changing arguments and also influenced
by Varadhan’s lemma. We show in two separate theorems that U(x) is a lower (resp., up-
per) bound to lim infn→∞Un(x) (resp., lim supn→∞Un(x)), where Un(·) := infpi∈Π Jn(·,pi).
Moreover, we show that the policy pi∗ is asymptotically optimal.
4.1 Lower bound
Theorem 4.1 For every x ≥ a one has lim infn→∞ Un(x) ≥ U(x).
Proof: Recall that U(x) = 0 for every x ≥ d. Since l ≥ 0 and also ρ > 0 it follows from
Jensen’s inequality that for any sequence of policies {pin}n, we have
1
n
lnE
[
e
n
(∫ τn
d
∧τna
0 l(W˜
n(t))dt+ρ1{τna ≤τnd }
)]
≥ 0.
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Fix x ∈ (a, d) and fix an arbitrary sequence of policies {pin}n ⊆ Π. We show that for every
ε > 0 there is N > 0 such that for every n > N one has Jn(x,pin) ≥ U(x) − w0(ε), where
w0(ε)→ 0 as ε→ 0.
We start with some preliminaries. Let ψ∗ be the function from (3.6) and let
ϕ˙∗(t) =


−e(ϕ∗(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ∗,
−e(a), T ∗ ≤ t,
(4.1)
with ϕ∗(0) = x, where T ∗ is the first time that ϕ∗ hits a, which is finite thanks to (3.2). Note
that up to time T ∗, ϕ∗ is the state process of the differential game associated with ψ∗ and any
control pi ∈ Π.
Let us fix ε1 > 0. Since l is Lipschitz then there exists γ1 > 0 such that for every
y, z ∈ [a,∞)
|y − z| < γ1 implies |l(y)− l(z)| < ε1. (4.2)
Moreover, since ϕ∗ is continuous and for t > T ∗, ϕ˙∗(t) < 0 it follows that one may choose γ1
such that
|ϕ− ϕ∗|T ∗+2ε1 ≤ γ1 implies |τa[ϕ] − T ∗| ≤ ε1, (4.3)
where τa[ϕ] := inf{t ≥ 0 : ϕ(t) = a}. Indeed, recall that ϕ(0) = x ∈ (a, d). Now, since
e(·) is positive on [a, d) we get from (4.1) that the state process ϕ∗ is strictly decreasing on
[0, T ∗ + 2ε1], touching a only at T ∗ and continuing to decrease on [T ∗, T ∗ + 2ε1].
Define the probability measure Q∗ = Q∗,n on (Ω,FT ∗+2ε1) by
dQ∗
dP
(t) = e−
√
n
∫ t
0 ψ˙
∗(s)dB(s)−n
2
∫ t
0 (ψ˙
∗)2(s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ∗ + 2ε1].
Then under Q∗, B∗(t) = B∗,n(t) := B(t) +
√
nµ−r
σ
t, t ∈ [0, T ∗ + 2ε1] is a standard Brownian
motion and
dW˜ n(t) = −e(W˜ n(t)) + 1√
n
σpin(W˜ n(t))dB∗(t), t ∈ [0, T ∗ + 2ε1].
Now, since that |pin(t)| ≤M1 then by Gronwall’s inequality and Doob’s martingale inequality
we get that there is a constant C1 > 0 that depends on the Lipschitz constant of e(·) such that
Q∗ ((En)c) ≤ C1M
2
1
nγ21
, (4.4)
where
En :=
{
ω :
∣∣∣W˜ n(·, ω)− ϕ∗(·, ω)∣∣∣
T ∗+2ε1
≤ γ1
}
.
Set N = N(ε1, γ1,M1, C1) such that
N > max

− ln(ε1)ε1 ,
C1M
2
1
ε1γ21
,
C1M
2
1 (T
∗ + 2ε1)
(
λ+ 12
(
µ−r
σ
)2)
ε1γ21

 . (4.5)
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We are now ready to bound from below Jn(x,pin). Fix n > N then
1
n
ln E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λnten
(∫ τna ∧t
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
dt
]
≥ 1
n
ln E
[∫ T ∗+2ε1
T ∗+ε1
e−λnten
(∫ τna ∧t
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
dt
]
≥ 1
n
ln E
[
ε1e
−λn(T ∗+2ε1)e
n
(∫ τna ∧(T∗+ε1)
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤T∗+ε1}
)]
=
1
n
ln EQ
∗
[
ε1e
−λn(T ∗+2ε1)e
n
(∫ τna ∧(T∗+ε1)
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤T∗+ε1}
)
dP
dQ∗
(T ∗ + 2ε1)
]
≥ EQ∗
[
−λ(T ∗ + 2ε1) +
∫ τna ∧(T ∗+ε1)
0
l(W˜ n(s))ds + ρ1{τna ≤T ∗+ε1} −
1
2
∫ T ∗+2ε1
0
(ψ˙∗)2(s)ds
]
− ε1
≥ EQ∗
[(
−λ(T ∗ + 2ε1) +
∫ τna ∧(T ∗+ε1)
0
l(W˜ n(s))ds + ρ1{τna ≤T ∗+ε1} −
1
2
∫ T ∗+2ε1
0
(ψ˙∗)2(s)ds
)
1En
]
− 2ε1
≥ EQ∗
[(
−λ(T ∗ + 2ε1) +
∫ T ∗−ε1
0
[l(ϕ∗(s))− ε1]ds+ ρ− 1
2
∫ T ∗+2ε1
0
(ψ˙∗)2(s)ds
)
1En
]
− 2ε1
=
(
−λ(T ∗ + 2ε1) +
∫ T ∗−ε1
0
[l(ϕ∗(s))− ε1]ds + ρ− 1
2
∫ T ∗+2ε1
0
(ψ˙∗)2(s)ds
)
Q∗(En)− 2ε1
= −λT ∗ +
∫ T ∗
0
l(ϕ∗(s))ds − 1
2
∫ T ∗
0
(ψ˙∗)2(s)ds+ ρ+ w0(ε1)
= U(x) + w0(ε1),
where
w0(ε1) =
(
−2λε1 −
∫ T ∗
T ∗−ε1
l(ϕ∗(s))ds− ε1(T ∗ − ε1)− 1
2
∫ T ∗+2ε1
T ∗
(ψ˙∗)2(s)ds
)
Q∗(En)− 2ε1
−
(
−λT ∗ +
∫ T ∗
0
l(ϕ∗(s))ds− 1
2
∫ T ∗
0
(ψ˙∗)2(s)ds+ ρ
)
(1−Q∗(En)).
The first three relations are easy to check. The forth relation follows by Jensen’s inequality
and by (4.4). The fifth relation follows since l(·) ≥ 0 and by (4.4) and (4.5). The sixth relation
follows by (4.2) and (4.3). The seventh relation follows since all the terms inside the expectation
besides the indicator are deterministic. Finally, the last relation follows by Proposition 3.2.
By (4.4) and (4.5) and recalling that −λT ∗+ ∫ T ∗0 l(ϕ∗(s))ds− 12 ∫ T ∗0 (ψ˙∗)2(s)ds+ρ = U(x) ≥ 0
we get that w0(ε1)→ 0 as ε1 → 0.
✷
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4.2 Asymptotically optimal policy
In this section we show that the optimal policy in the game, which was defined in (2.6) is
an asymptotically optimal policy in the stochastic model. We start with a technical lemma
that serves us in the proof of the preceding theorem. The lemma provides an upper bound
for the discounted cost by an alternative cost that is defined through a new measure Qn. Set
T := ρ/(λ− l(a)). Both Qn and T will play important roles during the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 4.1 For every n ∈ N, there exists a probability measure Qn ∼ P on [0, T ], for which
lim sup
1
n
lnE
[∫ ∞
0
e−λnten
(∫ τna ∧t
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
dt
]
(4.6)
≤ lim supEQn
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(∫ τna ∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ]ds+ ρ1{τna ≤t}
)]
− 1
n
H(Qn‖P),
where H(Qn‖P) := EQn
[
ln
(
dQn
dP
)]
is the relative entropy of Qn w.r.t. P. Also, there is N1 ∈ N
such that for every n > N1 one has
1
n
H(Qn‖P) ≤ 2ρ. (4.7)
Moreover, for every n ∈ N, there exists an adapted process (ψ(t))0≤t≤T such that Qn-almost
surely, ψn(·, ω) ∈ AC0[0, T ] and
∫ T
0 (ψ˙
n)2(s, ω) <∞, and
1
n
H(Qn‖P) = EQn
[
1
2
∫ T
0
(ψ˙n)2(s)ds
]
. (4.8)
Proof: First, notice that
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λnten
(∫ τna ∧t
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e−λnten
(∫ τna ∧t
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
dt+ enρ
∫ ∞
T
ent(l(a)−λ)dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
e−λnten
(∫ τna ∧t
0 l(W˜
n(s))ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
dt+
1
n(λ− l(a))e
n(ρ+T (l(a)−λ))
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e
n
(∫ τna ∧t
0 [l(W˜
n(s))−λ]ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
dt+
1
n(λ− l(a))
]
≤ TE
[
e
n sup
0≤t≤T
(∫ τna ∧t
0 [l(W˜
n(s))−λ]ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
+
1
ρn
]
.
The first inequality follows since l is non-increasing and since by eliminating the indicator in
the second exponent we only increase the cost. The second inequality follows by the choice of
T and since −λnt ≤ −λn(τna ∧ t). The other relations are easy to see.
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Now, for every n ∈ N let Qn be the measure that satisfies
1
n
ln
(
E
[
e
n sup
0≤t≤T
(∫ τna ∧t
0 [l(W˜
n(s))−λ]ds+ρ1{τna ≤t}
)])
(4.9)
= EQ
n
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(∫ τna ∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ]ds+ ρ1{τna ≤t}
)]
− 1
n
H(Qn‖P).
The existence of the measure Qn with the above representation is justified by the following
argument: It follows from Jensen’s inequality that for any measure Q ∼ P and
f = n sup
0≤t≤T
(∫ τna ∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ]ds+ ρ1{τna ≤t}
)
one has
ln
(
E
[
ef
])
= ln
(
E
Q
[
ef · dP
dQ
])
≥ EQ [f ]−H(Q‖P),
where equality holds for the measure Q that satisfies
dQ
dP
=
ef
E [ef ]
. (4.10)
By point i of Lemma 3.1, Theorem 4.1, and (4.9) we get that
0 ≤ U(x) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ J
n(x,pi∗) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
1
n
E
Qn [f ]− 1
n
H(Qn‖P)
)
≤ ρ− lim sup
n→∞
(
1
n
H(Qn‖P)
)
,
where the last inequality follows since λ > l(·). Hence, (4.7) holds.
We now turn to the last part of the lemma. Since the r.h.s. of (4.10) conditioned on Ft is
a positive P -martingale, then it can be expressed as an exponential martingale. That is, there
is a predictable and square integrable process (un(t))0≤t≤T such that
dQn
dP
(t) = e
√
n
∫ t
0
un(s)dB(s)−n
2
∫ t
0
(un)2(s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Now, for Qn-almost every ω define ψn(·, ω) as the Lesbegue integral of un(·, ω).
Finally, notice that under Qn, B(t)−√nun(t), t ∈ [0, T ] is a Brownian motion and therefore
(4.8) holds.
✷
Theorem 4.2 For every x ≥ a one has lim supn→∞ Jn(x,pi∗) ≤ U(x), where pi∗ is defined
on (2.6).
Proof: Fix x ≥ a. Notice that by (4.6) it is sufficient to bound the lim sup of its r.h.s. by
U(x).
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During the proof we will make use of the state process and the wealth process under the
control pi∗, which was defined via the function pi∗, see (2.6). Consider Qn and ψn from Lemma
4.1. Under Qn
dW˜ n(t) =
(
−e(W˜ n(t)) + (µ − r)pi∗(W˜ n(t)) + σpi∗(W˜ n(t))ψ˙n(t)
)
dt+
1√
n
σpi∗(W˜ n(t))dBn(t),
(4.11)
t ∈ (0, T ] and W˜ n(0) = x, where Bn(t) = B(t) − √nψn(t) is a standard Brownian motion
under Qn. Also, set
ϕ˙n(t) = −e(ϕn(t)) + (µ − r)pi∗(ϕn(t)) + σpi∗(ϕn(t))ψ˙n(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (4.12)
ϕn(0) = x.
For any δ > 0, we define
An(δ) = {ω : |W˜ n − ϕn|τa[W˜n]∧T ≤ δ}, (4.13)
where τa[h] := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : h(t) ≤ a} with the convention that inf ∅ =∞. Let us write
E
Qn
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds + ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
]
(4.14)
= EQ
n
[(
sup
0≤t≤T
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds + ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
)
1An(δ)
]
+ EQ
n
[(
sup
0≤t≤T
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds + ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
)
1(An(δ))c
]
.
For ω ∈ An(δ), we have τa[W˜ n] ≥ τa+δ[ϕn]. Then there is a constant c1 > 0 that depends on
the Lipschitz constant of l(·) such that on An(δ) and for every t ∈ [0, T ],∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds+ ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
≤
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(ϕn(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds+ ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t} + c1δ
≤
∫ τa+δ[ϕn]∧t
0
[l(ϕn(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds + ρ1{τa+δ [ϕn]≤t} + c1δ
≤ Ua+δ(x) + c1δ.
Here we denote by Ua+δ(x) the function defined by (2.4) with a replaced by a + δ. The last
inequality follows since the optimal control pi∗ defined by (2.6) is, according to its explicit form,
the optimal control also for the differential game with a replaced by a+ δ. Therefore,
E
Qn
[(
sup
0≤t≤T
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds + ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
)
1An(δ)
]
≤ (Ua+δ(x) + c1δ)Qn(An(δ)).
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On the other hand,
E
Qn
[(
sup
0≤t≤T
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds+ ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
)
1(An(δ))c
]
≤ ρQn((An(δ))c).
Plugging the last two inequalities into (4.14) we conclude
E
Qn
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds+ ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
]
≤ Ua+δ(x) + c1δ + (ρ− Ua+δ(x)− c1δ)Qn((An(δ))c).
In the following, we shall show that
lim
n→∞Q
n((An(δ))
c) = 0, (4.15)
from which it follows that
lim sup EQ
n
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds + ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
]
≤ Ua+δ(x) + c1δ.
(4.16)
Notice that by Proposition 3.1, for every x ≥ a, Ua(x) is continuous as a function of a. Letting
δ → 0 in (4.16) we get
lim sup EQ
n
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∫ τa[W˜n]∧t
0
[l(W˜ n(s))− λ− 1
2
(ψ˙n(s))2]ds+ ρ1{τa[W˜n]≤t}
]
≤ Ua(x) = U(x),
which is what we want to prove.
We now show that (4.15) holds. By (4.11) and (4.12), we have for every t ∈ [0, T ]
W˜ n(t)− ϕn(t) =
∫ t
0
[
− e(W˜ n(s))− e(ϕn(s)) + (µ − r)(pi∗(W˜ n(s))− pi∗(ϕn(s)))
+ σ(pi∗(W˜ n(s))− pi∗(ϕn(s)))ψ˙n(s)
]
ds+ ξn(t),
where
ξn(t) :=
1√
n
σpi∗(W˜ n(t)dBn(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Since e(·) and pi∗(·) are Lipschitz, there is a constant c2 > 0 such that for every t ∈ [0, T ]
|W˜ n(t)− ϕn(t)| ≤ c2
∫ t
0
(1 + |ψ˙n(s)|)|W˜ n(s)− ϕn(s)|ds + |ξn|t
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By Gronwall’s inequality it follows that
|W˜ n(t)− ϕn(t)| ≤ ec2
∫ t
0 (1+|ψ˙n(s)|ds)|ξn|t.
Therefore,
|W˜ n − ϕn|τa[W˜n]∧T ≤ ec2
∫ T
0 (1+|ψ˙n(s)|ds)|ξn|τa[W˜n]∧T . (4.17)
For any K > T , consider
Bn(K) =
{
ω :
∫ T
0
(1 + |ψ˙n(s)|ds) ≤ K
}
. (4.18)
Clearly,
(An(δ))
c = ((An(δ))
c ∩Bn(K)) ∪ ((An(δ))c ∩ (Bn(K))c).
From (4.13), (4.17), and (4.18), it follows that
(An(δ))
c ∩Bn(K) ⊂
{
ω : |ξn|τa[W˜n]∧T ≥ e−c2Kδ
}
.
By Doob’s martingale inequality we have
E
Qn
[
|ξn|2
τa[W˜n]∧T
]
≤ 4EQn
[
ξn(τa[W˜
n] ∧ T )2
]
≤ c2T
n
.
Thus,
Qn((An(δ))
c ∩Bn(K)) ≤ e
2c2K
δ2
E
Qn
[
|ξn|2
τa[W˜n]∧T
]
≤ c2Te
2c2K
nδ2
.
On the other hand,
Qn((An(δ))
c ∩ (Bn(K))c) ≤ Qn((Bn(K))c) ≤ Qn
(∫ T
0
|ψ˙n(s)|2ds > (K − T )
2
T
)
≤ T
(K − T )2E
Qn
[ ∫ T
0
|ψ˙n(s)|2ds
]
,
where the second inequality follows from (4.18). Due to (4.7) and (4.8), there is N1 > 0 such
that for every n ≥ N1, we have
E
Qn
[ ∫ T
0
|ψ˙n(s)|2ds
]
≤ 4ρ.
Hence, for every n ≥ N1, we have
Qn((An(δ))
c ∩ (Bn(K))c) ≤ 4ρT
(K − T )2 .
Fix ε > 0. Let K > T be such that
4ρT
(K − T )2 ≤
ε
2
.
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Take N = max{N1, N2}. then for every n ≥ N , we have
Qn((An(δ))
c) < ε.
This implies (4.15).
✷
Acknowledgement: We thank the two anonymous referees, the AE and Huyeˆn Pham for
insightful comments, which helped us improve our paper. We are also grateful to Virginia
Young for many discussions that we had on the subject. This research is supported in part by
the National Science Foundation through the DMS-1613170 grant.
References
[1] R. Atar and A. Biswas. Control of the multiclass G/G/1 queue in the moderate deviation
regime. The Annals of Applied Probability, 424(5):2033–2069, 2014.
[2] R. Atar and A. Cohen. An asymptotically optimal control for a multiclass queueing model
in the moderate-deviation heavy-traffic regime. Preprint, 2015.
[3] R. Atar and A. Cohen. A differential game for a multiclass queueing model in the
moderate-deviation heavy-traffic regime. Preprint, 2015.
[4] E. Bayraktar and V.R. Young. Correspondence between lifetime minimum wealth and
utility of consumption. Finance and Stochastics, 11(2):213–236, 2007.
[5] E. Bayraktar and V.R. Young. Minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin under borrowing
constraints. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 41(1):196–221, 2007.
[6] E. Bayraktar and V.R. Young. Optimal investment strategy to minimize occupation time.
Annals of Operations Research, 176(1):389–408, 2010.
[7] E. Bayraktar and V.R. Young. Proving regularity of the minimal probability of ruin via
a game of stopping and control. Finance and Stochastics, 15(4):785–818, 2011.
[8] E. Bayraktar and Y. Zhang. Minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin under ambiguity
aversion. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 53(1):58–90, 2015.
[9] S. Browne. Survival and growth with a liability: Optimal portfolio strategies in continuous
time. Mathematics of Operations Research, 22(2):468–493, 1997.
[10] S. Browne. Beating a moving target: Optimal portfolio strategies for outperforming a
stochastic benchmark. Finance and Stochastics, 3(3):275–294, 1999.
[11] S. Browne. Reaching goals by a deadline: digital options and continuous-time active
portfolio management. Adv. in Appl. Probab., 31(2):551–577, 06 1999.
[12] A. Dembo and O. Zeitouni. Large deviations techniques and applications, volume 38 of
Applications of Mathematics (New York). Springer-Verlag, New York, second edition,
1998.
20
[13] L.E. Dubins and L.J. Savage. How to gamble if you must : Inequalities for stochastic
processes. McGraw-Hill series in probability and statistics. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965.
[14] P. Dupuis and H. Kushner. Minimizing escape probabilities: a large deviations approach.
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 27(2):432–445, 1989.
[15] W.H. Fleming. Risk sensitive stochastic control and differential games. Commun. Inf.
Syst., 6(3):161–177, 2006.
[16] W.H. Fleming and W.M. McEneaney. Risk-sensitive control on an infinite time horizon.
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 33(6):1881–1915, 1995.
[17] W.H. Fleming and H.M Soner. Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions.
Stochastic modelling and applied probability. Springer, New York, 2006.
[18] I. Karatzas. Adaptive control of a diffusion to a goal, and a parabolic MongeAmpere-type
equation. Asian Journal of Mathematics, 1:295–313, 1997.
[19] M. Kulldorff. Optimal control of favorable games with a time limit. SIAM Journal on
Control and Optimization, 31(1):52–69, 1993.
[20] M.A. Milevsky and C. Robinson. Self-annuitization and ruin in retirement. North Amer-
ican Actuarial Journal, 4(4):112–124, 2000.
[21] S. Orey, V.C. Pestien, and W.D. Sudderth. Reaching zero rapidly. SIAM Journal on
Control and Optimization, 25(5):1253–1265, 1987.
[22] V.C. Pestien and W.D. Sudderth. Continuous-time red and black: How to control a
diffusion to a goal. Mathematics of Operations Research, 10(4):pp. 599–611, 1985.
[23] H. Pham. Some applications and methods of large deviations in finance and insurance. In
Paris-Princeton Lectures on Mathematical Finance 2004, volume 1919 of Lecture Notes
in Mathematics, pages 191–244. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007.
[24] A. Poznyak. Advanced Mathematical Tools for Control Engineers: Volume 1: Determin-
istic Techniques. Elsevier Science, 2009.
[25] W.D. Sudderth and A. Weerasinghe. Controlling a process to a goal in finite time. Math-
ematics of Operations Research, 14(3):pp. 400–409, 1989.
[26] H. Yener. Minimizing the lifetime ruin under borrowing and short-selling constraints.
Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 2014(6):535–560, 2014.
[27] V.R. Young. Optimal investment strategy to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin.
North American Actuarial Journal, 8(4):106–126, 2004.
21
